INTRODUCTION
Appraisal proceedings have hardly been the Delaware courts' finest moments. For decades, these courts eschewed evidence based on widely accepted finance methodology, holding instead that determinations of value were questions of law and not fact. (1985) , which concludes "that the Delaware block method is inconsistent with modem valuation theory and that, in general, the stock market price supplies the most essential ingredient in an enlightened approach to share appraisal." Id. at 119. 2 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983) (declaring the "Delaware Block" or weighted average method to be "clearly outmoded" and stating that subsequent appraisals "must include proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community").
current methodology is generally market-based, the courts nevertheless continue to speak of value in ways that show a deep misunderstanding of valuation methodology and a distrust of market values. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court has stated that the market price of shares may not be representative of true value . In Smith v. Van
5
Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court criticized a board that relied on a 46% premium over the market because it was uninformed about "intrinsic value." 6 More recently, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected an appraised valuation that was 200% above the pre-transaction market value on the basis that the "trial court's decision to reject the addition of a control premium... placed too much emphasis on market value." 7 The court criticized the chancery court's valuation as too low because it failed to add a control premium to the market price of comparable companies to reach the asserted value of the whole firm, choosing instead to use the "discounted" market price of a small block of shares in the trading market." The pre-announcement market price was $17.25; 9 the consideration paid in the cash-out merger was worth approximately $28;'° the appraised value initially determined by the chancery court was $51;1" and the final value awarded 3 While the market value of a company's stock does not necessarily accurately estimate that company's future cash flows, the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) demonstrates that a certain deference needs to be given to market value. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 369-70 (6th ed. 2000) (cautioning management to pay attention to market values in a subchapter entitled "The Six Lessons of Market Efficiency"). We urge courts to heed this advice. 4 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del. 1989) ("[I] t is not a breach of faith for directors to determine that the present stock market price of shares is not representative of true value or that there may indeed be several market values for any corporation's stock."). Whether or not this statement is true, the court fails to suggest any of the reasons for this shortcoming, such as the existence of material nonpublic information. See Daniel R. Fischel, Market Evidence in Corporate Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 941, 941 (2002) (arguing "that courts should rely more heavily on market prices when resolving valuation disputes").
5 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) .
market value of stock in any publicly traded company is merely the value of a minority interest which necessarily reflects a minority discount.' This reasoning denies that the value of an entire company is simply the market value of its equity plus the market value of its debt. The Delaware courts have accepted this wisdom and have rejected the "aggregate market value" approach to valuing shares of a company in an appraisal proceeding. Under Delaware's current approach, the value of the company as a going concern must include that element of value known as the control premium.' 9 This approach poses a fundamental challenge to the "law of one price, 2 0 which asserts that arbitrage will tend to trade away any difference between price and eco-21 nomic value.
We argue that both the received wisdom and the Delaware approach contain fundamental misconceptions about value. In addition, the Delaware approach creates conflicts in the way minority shareholders are treated in various forced-sale situations (e.g., stockfor-stock mergers and at least some reverse stock splits) that can only be reconciled by rejecting the notion that control premiums inhere in the values of all companies.
Part I is the doctrinal section of this Article. It reviews the Delaware cases that have adopted a "control premium" approach to valuation. We argue that these decisions have misread earlier precedents that required a firm to be valued as a going concern-with all its warts-rather than at a higher liquidation value that would have eliminated agency costs or at a post-transaction value that would have assumed potential synergies from a hypothetical (and thus speculative) business combination. 18 See, e.g., Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 (Del. 1992) (stating that the "exclusion of a 'control premium' artificially and unrealistically treated Rapid as a minority shareholder"); Le Beau v. M.G. Bancorporation, No. 13414, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *25 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1998) (determining that an expert witness's capital market valuation approach included a "built-in minority discount"). Interestingly, this same wisdom does not apply to the market value of debt so that, in determining a company's equity value, a court is free to subtract only the market value of debt from the value of the firm even if such debt is trading at a discount. Rapid-Am., 603 A.2d at 804.
19 Infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 20 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 3, at 796 n.8 (defining the "law of one price" as the gurchasing power parity principle applied to the price of a single good).
Id. at 38 & n.3. This also poses a challenge-correct or not-to the general acceptance by much of the academic literature of ECMH, which according to some is one of the most well established hypotheses in all the social sciences. See, e.g., Michael Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, 4 MIDLAND CoRP. FIN. J., Summer 1986, at 6, 11.
[Vol. 152: 845 Part II reviews the literature that argues for the addition of a control premium to the stock price of every publicly traded company. We demonstrate that the basis for this argument is not supported by the presently available evidence. Control premiums are only paid when a bidder perceives that a purchase of control is worthwhile-where there are gains from trade. Moreover, despite the claims of the Delaware courts and some commentators, there are not multiple and separate markets for shares of firms (e.g., trading markets for small blocks and a separate market for corporate control). We expressly exclude consideration of a control premium in second stage takeout mergers, where a control premium has already been paid. We should emphasize that our enterprise is quite limited: we only address the imputation of a control premium in freeze-out mergers where there is no related control transaction.
Part III relaxes the assumption of efficient capital markets and reviews the fairness arguments that revolve around the disparate treatment of shareholders. We explain that these arguments are rejected either by evidence of ex ante payments or the widespread availability of contractual arrangements to allocate the receipt of control premiums. Accordingly, if public investors discount the price they pay for shares to reflect their lack of control over firm policies and agency costs, then compensating them on the basis of the same "minority discount" is not unfair. In other words, shareholders who receive the market value of their shares either through appraisal or selling into the market, generally, get what they paid for.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the structure and language of Delaware's appraisal statute to show that it contemplates paying minority shareholders for what they owned, and that this provides them with full compensation. Here, we show that where market exceptions to appraisal are present, shareholders will always receive as "fair value" the market price with its claimed "minority discount," rather than receive a control premium. To pay more when appraisal is available not only provides those shareholders with a windfall at the expense of the majority, but also creates a conflict in Delaware corporate law. The Delaware Supreme Court's approval of market value as fair value in a recent reverse stock split that eliminated small shareholders highlights the conflict with its use of control premiums in other areas.
Ultimately, we urge courts to presume that market value is the best measure of fair value. The burden should then be placed on dissenting shareholders to prove why and to what extent market value is inadequate. We believe this would improve the accuracy of appraisal valuations and at the same time achieve judicial economies.
I. DELAWARE'S TREATMENT OF CONTROL PREMIUMS
We begin by tracing how the Delaware courts first rejected the notion of any premium over "going concern value" that might result from a sale or liquidation and then used that same going concern doctrine to conclude that a share was always worth less than its pro rata share of the value of the going concern. The logic of the "going concern" doctrine simply cannot bear this burden. Nonetheless, while denying that any speculative elements of value should be employed, the courts have reached the point where a control premium has become an integral part of the value of every going concern, regardless of how speculative such a control premium might be. The court did note that market values were sometimes valid for items such as chattel and stock in a company not set to merge, since, if paid the market value, an individual "could easily step into the market and replace presumably at the quoted prices the chattels [sic] or stock which the defendant converted.
A. Rejection of Market Values
2 7 Nevertheless, the court ruled that the only way the plaintiff could be made whole was to give him the "intrinsic value" of his shares.
8 While this decision predates modem portfolio theory, 29 it set a precedent for the focus on "intrinsic value 20 and wrongly concluded that each company's stock is a unique financial asset. It is understandable that a court in 1934 might not understand how fungible any one share is in a diversified portfolio; however, it is remarkable that the court's conclusion, based on this misunderstanding-that "intrinsic value" diverges from (and is presumably greater than) market value in some systematic way-continues to this day.
set by its systematic risk, i.e. its beta, and that firm-specific risk of a stock is irrelevant to rational, diversified investors. preme Court developed the doctrine that a shareholder's interest in a company is a pro rata share of the value of the shareholders' equity in a going concern. The court did not address either control premiums or minority discounts. Rather, it addressed shares in a closed-end mutual fund that had traded at a discount from the fund's net asset value prior to a merger. 3 3 In this context, the court declined to value shares at their net asset value, but instead followed the appraiser's methodology, which constructed a value of the entire fund based on its "fair asset value" and then discounted this value at the same rate that the shares were discounted by the market prior to the merger.4 Thus, nothing in the opinion pointed directly toward a control premium, except a possible strained interpretation of dicta in the case.
3 5 Essentially, the court held that since shareholders invested in assets the value of which was discounted by virtue of their ownership by a closedend fund (with its presumed agency costs), it was fair to compensate exiting investors in the same way. s6 We call this the rule of "in at a discount, out at a discount."
The next "going concern" decision was Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 7 where a huge disparity existed between the net asset value and the market value of a firm. s8 Once again the court rejected attempts to use net asset value as the measure of value, because the corporation
was not liquidating. Therefore, the court held, the corporation must be valued on a going concern basis and simply quoted its own earlier (Del. 1952) , the court stated that a dissenting shareholder was entitled to receive "the substantial equivalent in value of the shares he held before the merger," and was not entitled to a share of the firm's liquidating value.
[Vol. 152: 845 decision in Tri-Continental for the proposition that the shareholder is to be compensated for her proportionate interest in a going concern. 40 Once again, the decision was more concerned with the methods for valuing the entire firm than with the proportion to be received by each shareholder. The "proportionate interest" language could fairly be described as dicta. As in Tri-Continental, shareholders who bought into a company, the asset value of which was reduced by agency costs, were not allowed to measure their value upon exit on another basis. The question of minority discounts, while not directly relevant to our consideration of the value of an entire firm, played a role in the valuation formulation in Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett. 4 ' That case involved the valuation of a minority shareholder's 1.5% interest in a
42
closely held corporation where there was no market for the shares.
In an appraisal proceeding, the chancery court valued the entire corporation. On appeal, the majority stockholders argued that Harnett's small interest should have been subjected to a minority discount. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this argument, citing Tri-Continental and Bell for the "proportionate interest" dicta, and concluded that "to fail to accord to a minority shareholder the full proportionate value of his shares imposes a penalty for lack of control, and unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who may reap a windfall from the appraisal process by cashing out a dissenting shareholder, a clearly undesirable result., 43 Closely held corporations are not within the set of cases we discuss here, and thus we do not address the logic or wisdom of the holding in Cavalier. We do believe, however, that the result in Cavalier is not compelled by the holdings of the going concern cases for publicly traded shares. The real point is that Cavalier, like earlier decisions, provides no support for the imputation of a control premium in all appraisal cases in order to obtain an "intrinsic value." Nevertheless, the cases we have discussed form the doctrinal basis for the control premium cases that followed. 
C. The Market Price and Minority Discount Argument
Delaware began approaching its modern formulation of value in 1985, in Smith v. Van Gorkom.44 In that case, the court held that a board's reliance on the market price of Trans Union's stock was unjustified if the board's task was to determine the intrinsic value of a firm for purposes ofjudging the adequacy of a sale price. 45 At issue was a proposed control transaction that reasonably anticipated a premium. 46 One of us has argued elsewhere that predicting control premiums in the context of a contemplated control transaction is an impossible exercise, because it involves predicting the outcome of an auction. Carney, supra note 30, at 532-35. 488 A.2d at 876. 48 The court relied in part on claims by Trans Union managers that its stock was "undervalued," and acknowledged that this was a widely held view of managers. Id.
One could also characterize this as a cognitive bias entitled to little or no credence. The valuation question is clouded by Trans Union's possession of tax benefits it could not utilize in its current form, but we fail to see how this differs from the valuable assets trapped in a closed-end fund or the timber holdings of Kirby Lumber, at least in the context of an appraisal proceeding. 49 [Vol. 152: 845 premium. 4 In the appraisal proceeding, the company's experts valued Rapid as a conglomerate, which it was. The dissenter's expert, on the other hand, disaggregated the company and valued its subsidiaries separately, reasoning that while there were no comparable conglomerates, there were companies comparable to each of the subsidiaries.
55
Having reached a market value for each of the subsidiaries, the dissenter's expert then added a control premium, because Rapid owned all the stock of each subsidiary. 56 Citing Tri-Continental as authority for valuation adjustments (from net asset value) at the corporate level, the Delaware Supreme Court approved the addition of a control premium to the extrapolated market value for each subsidiary.
7
The court noted that the dissenter's expert had valued the subsidiaries by using the market price of similar shares and that "[t] hese shares presumptively traded at a price that discounted the 'control premium.
' 58 The court concluded that "[t] he exclusion of a 'control premium' artificially and unrealistically treated Rapid as a minority shareholder. Contrary to Rapid's arguments, Delaware law compels the inclusion of a control premium under the unique facts of this case., 59 The "unique facts" to which the court referred must have been Rapid's status as a holding company, which operated only through its three wholly-owned subsidiaries. 60 This approach was followed in M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, in which the holding company possessed a majority interest in two operating banks."' In that case, the 54 Rapid-Am. Corp., 603 A.2d at 798, 800. 55 Id. at 800. Disaggregating Rapid and valuing its assets separately from the conglomerate as a going concern was an approach previously rejected in both jected as too narrow the argument that the "unique fact" in Rapid-American was that its subsidiaries were involved in three separate industries. Id. at 525. "Therefore, any holding company's ownership of a controlling interest in a subsidiary at the time of the merger is an 'operative reality' and an independent element of value that must be taken into account in determining a fair value for the parent company's stock." Id. 61 Id.
court sanctioned valuation of subsidiaries based on acquisition prices paid for comparable banks.
2
This doctrine could have been limited to the valuation of holding companies.
It began modestly in Tri-Continental with the holding that the market value of assets, namely marketable securities, could be adjusted to reflect their diminished value when held by a closed-end investment company.6 While the Delaware Supreme Court has recently noted this fact, it has declined to limit adjustments in market values to such cases. 65 Rather, the Delaware Chancery Court has extended this approach to all corporate valuations, holding that valuation based on analysis of comparable companies "produces an equity valuation that inherently reflects a minority discount .... Because that value is not fully reflective of the intrinsic worth of the corporation on a going concern basis, this court has applied an explicit control premium in calculating the fair value of the equity in an appraisal proceeding." 63 Most interestingly, with respect to the diversified holding companies structure, any "control premium" based on the holding company's ownership might actually be negative. [Vol. 152: 845 the court in Tri-Continental valued the assets as they existed in a going concern-that is, at a discount from each asset's independent fair market value. This discount, which some say exists because of the agency costs of closed-end firms, 68 would persist until the firm was liquidated or acquired by some other type of firm with lower agency costs. At the same time, if control blocks in closed-end firms enable owners to extract private benefits at the expense of the public shareholders, these blocks should trade at a premium. 9 In short, it is important to note that the court did not calculate firm value as if a change of control were about to occur. Rather, it assumed the continuing management of the business as it then existed-with no valuecreating control transaction.
The current approach leads Delaware courts to speculate about takeover values under circumstances where the probability of a takeover may be quite remote, as it was in Rapid-American. This approach also leads courts into the risky exercise of predicting control premiums if companies were sold, which are precisely the "speculative elements of value [that] should be excluded from the valuation calculus." 69 See id. at 268, 276-81 (demonstrating that the presence of large block holdings increases the discounts from net asset value in closed-end funds from four percent to fourteen percent, and examining the ways in which blockholders extract benefits not shared with public stockholders). Were these large blocks to be transferred, we assume that these benefits would be priced, thus creating a premium over market prices. ., which are known or susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and not the product of speculation may be considered.").
unbiased estimates of the value of the equity of such firms. 71 We do not claim that any market is perfectly efficient; that is not a necessary condition of our argument. Rather, we claim that a presumption should be employed that market prices are efficiently set and reasonably accurate absent convincing evidence to the contrary. Given the courts' institutional difficulties in making alternative estimates of value, it is only prudent to minimize the adversarial process, in which two experts take polar positions, by giving deference to market values. 73 For those with greater skepticism about ECMH, in Part III we offer an alternative argument about fairness and in Part IV we demonstrate the conflicts created by the control premium decisions.
We do not address appraisal valuations in second-stage takeout mergers that follow a successful takeover bid. 74 We also do not deal with closely-held corporations and the related problems of minority and liquidity discounts, where there is no ascertainable market price.
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71 Without engaging in a full discussion of ECMH, this is generally what is referred to as semi-strong form efficiency. We do not digress to discuss recent challenges to ECMH, except to note that ECMH remains, in the view of some, one of the bestestablished hypotheses in all the social sciences. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 21, at 11 (noting that "[a] lthough the evidence is not literally 100 percent in support of the efficient market hypothesis, there is no better documented proposition in any of the social sciences"); see also Finally, we do not focus on the question of whether market prices may be depressed because the controlling shareholder has extracted excessive (and presumably illegal) private benefits from the corpora-76 tion .
A. Common Sense About Control Premiums
The received economic wisdom of courts may contain some fundamental misconceptions about value. The misunderstanding involved is understandable, in part, because control premiums are observable. It also has a certain intuitive quality that seems to confirm its truthfulness. Whenever control of a company is transferred, one can easily observe that the transfer occurs at a price above the preannouncement market value of the shares.
A rich empirical literature demonstrates that these premiums exist, and that they can be large. From this, it is easy to see how one could conclude that such premiums inhere in all companies and should be considered in any particular company's appraisal. The intuitive appeal stems from the desire to protect minorities from overreaching by majorities, and the apparent belief that whenever any minority shareholder receives something 76 Where the price is so depressed, we presume that a derivative action would be available against the controlling shareholder and that the expected value of that recove7 is an element of going concern value to be added to market value. Jensen, supra note 21, at 7. different in kind (e.g., shares rather than cash), there has been some element of overreaching or unfairness. Our reason for suggesting that this conclusion is a misunderstanding is relatively simple: control premiums only occur in transactions involving a transfer of control, where there are thought to be gains from trade, either because of a perception by the purchaser that the transaction offers some opportunity to create new value within the target firm 8 or because the bidder believes that the market value of the target's shares is depressed and it can earn an abnormal return by holding target shares until the market price reflects full value.
8 ' Even if all values, both present and potential, are valued in the market price for the firm's shares, one would not expect to find a discernible control premium in a widely held firm that is well managed and appears to offer little probability of a transfer of control. Any small probability of a control transaction will already be reflected in the market price, because absent a dominant shareholder, all shareholders expect to have an equal opportunity to share in any such premium, should it appear. Absent an actual transfer of control, control premiums represent probabilities of a control transfer at a premium. Where the probability is close to zero, so is the premium.
B. Stories of Separate Markets
We turn now to the academic discussion of the market for corporate control and the arguments concerning control premiums that 80 These premiums are offered in public tender offers in order to overcome freerider problems. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELLJ. ECON. 42, 42-43 (1980) (noting that shareholders can free ride on a bidder's improvement of a poorly run corporation after a successful takeover bid, thereby limiting the raider's profit and making the takeover less likely to occur). In the case of a negotiated purchase of control from a single shareholder or a group, the premium is offered both to account for the private benefits controlling shareholders receive and to provide a price that at least meets their reservation price, but may well be higher because of the uncertainties of negotiating under conditions of bilateral monopoly. For example, in Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., Vice Chancellor Hartnett rejected the blended value of a takeover bid as the measure of the target's value on the date of the merger, stating that it "is often an unreliable guide to the true market value because it may reflect a control premium and other factors connected with the acquiror's [sic] intentions but unrelated to the value of the firm as a going concern." No. 3 Manne introduced the concept of a market for corporate control without claiming that it was somehow separate from the market for small lots of shares. He simply argued that, as management quality and effort declined, so did expected earnings, so that stock prices would decline relative to those of well-managed companies. A lower stock price would both facilitate and provide the impetus for takeovers, costly as they might be. He observed that "the potential return from the successful take-over and revitalization of a poorly run company can be enormous. For instance, a takeover bid introduces important new information about the value of a firm-that someone, other than current management, believes they could achieve greater cash flows for investors from the existing assets. In the parlance of efficient market analysis, this is "news." The fact that a takeover bid is a low-probability event for many firms explains why prices of even badly managed firms do not rise to reflect the full value of a potential control premium; 86 they reflect only its expected value under conditions of uncertainty. Many firms are well managed, or at least not much more badly managed then the average, and consequently offer few potential gains in a takeover. In such a case, both the probability of and expected gains from a takeover bid may be trivial. But in both cases, efficient markets should set prices to reflect the particular situation of each firm.
Not all scholars accept this view. One counterexplanation has been offered by Martin Shubik: "These assumptions [of efficient capital markets] ... are set up to rule out, by assumption, the possibility that the market for a few shares of the stock of a corporation and the market for control of a corporation may be fundamentally different markets. 's7 Shubik elaborates on his challenge to the law of one price:
The lawyers may talk about a premium for control. But to a true believer of efficient markets, there cannot be a premium for control. If, in contradistinction to the adherents of the single, efficient market, we suggest that there are several more or less imperfect markets involving the market for a few shares, the market for control, the market for going-business assets, and the market for assets in liquidation, then we have a structure for interpreting what is going on in terms of arbitrage among these different markets.8
Shubik's argument uses the term "market" loosely. Stigler has described a "market" as a situation where prices of homogeneous goods are identical. 89 Discrete markets exist when different prices appear, which are generally not arbitraged away because of transaction costs, transportation costs, or cultural differences that inhibit complete arbitrage. 90 Henderson ed., 1993) ("Under this law, there is a uniform price in the market, and price differences are quickly eliminated by arbitrage."), http://www.econlib.org/ library/Enc/lnformation.html. 90 Stiglitz, supra note 89. Shubik correctly argues that the pool of purchasers of a firm's assets may be different (thinner) than the pool of purchasers of its shares. Shubik, supra note 87, at 32-33. In some cases, if there is only one prospective asset purchaser, conditions of bilateral monopoly exist, making prediction of the magnitude of a control premium more difficult. But this does not address the probability that a transaction in control will be reflected in the market price.
[Vol. 152: 845 sense of different reservation prices.
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' A takeover bid appears in the same market in which trading occurs, and the news of the bid instantaneously moves the market price to a new level, approximating traders' estimations of the bid's prospect for success, discounting for the time value of money and the probability of oversubscription and prorationing. Thus, there is no evidence of the simultaneous existence of separate market prices for control and for minority interests. This demonstrates that the law of one price prevails at any one time, and that prices change only when the probability of an event, such as a 92 change of control, changes.
Another version of the separate market story is offered without any attempt at a theory: It simply asserts that all publicly traded shares reflect an implicit minority discount. 93 Responding to an assertion without a theory is impossible and probably not worthwhile. Yet, unfortunately, it is the current operative assumption of the Delaware courts.
While economists have developed sophisticated models demonstrating how arbitrage occurs between markets, 94 none of these models are necessary in this context, because only one market exists for the shares of each company. 91 In that sense, investors are price-takers, not price-searchers. Auctions exist to deal with the problems of heterogeneous goods or traders, by allowing efficient pricesearching "where sellers are unsure about the values that bidders attach to the object being sold." VIJAY KRISHNA, AUCTION THEORY 3 (2002). The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is a "continuous auction market" that searches for prices intertemporally, as "news" continuously alters reservation prices of both buyers and sellers. See Mark Borelli, Market Making in the Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 822 (2001) ("The NYSE is a continuous auction market in which orders can be executed anytime the exchange is open."). 92 Coates provides an expanded description of arbitrage under these conditions, pointing out that the presence of a controlling shareholder in the target means that market prices will also reflect the risk that a bidder will acquire control directly from the controlling shareholder and the probability that the new controlling shareholder will deal more or less fairly with the minority shareholders. John C. Coates 
C. Assertions of Demand Elasticities
Another argument that markets provide unreliable information about firm values is primarily authored by Lynn Stout, who argues that shares of particular corporations are unique and thus scarce assets with downward-sloping demand curves.9 This theory also implies an upward-sloping supply curve in the face of a takeover bid. 96 Under this theory, the market price of shares is an unreliable indicator of value, because unless one knows the slope of the demand curve, one cannot calculate the subjective gains of those valuing their shares at less than the takeover price and the subjective losses of those who value their shares at a higher price. Stout's views seem to be in accord with those of many courts that decline to be guided by market values in an appraisal process.9
7 The principal difficulty with this argument is the assumption that a bidder will ever pay the reservation price of those shareholders whose reservation prices are above the market price.9s This theory also directly contradicts modem portfolio theory, which teaches that any investor can build a diversified portfolio by using a variety of financial instruments (minimizing nonsystematic risk) to achieve the desired level of risk and return (accounting for systematic risk).99 Hence, the aphorism, "seen one stock, seen them all."' 00 According to modem portfolio theory, the demand curve for any stock facing a particular selling shareholder is flat (varying reservation 95 Stout, supra note 88, at 1239; see also Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 454-55 (Del. Ch. 1934) ("The relation of supply to demand on a given day as truly affects the market value of a stock as it does of a commodity; and temporary supply and demand are in turn affected by numerous circumstances which are wholly disconnected from considerations having to do with the stock's inherent worth.").
96 See Stout, supra note 88, at 1267 ("Less-than-unanimous shareholder approval of merger and asset sales ... forces dissenting shareholders to part with their shares for a price they believe inadequate."). prices among some prospective buyers notwithstanding), 7 and the supply curve facing any buyer (not signaling a prospective takeover bid or possession of material nonpublic information) is equally flat. In short, absent a takeover bid, no shareholder can obtain more than the present market price for her shares when selling them. We are all price-takers, absent a takeover bid.
D. Coordination Costs: Private Benefits of Complete Ownership
To the extent that shareholders are heterogeneous and dispersed, conflicts may arise among them over divergent preferences for firm distributions, investments, and risky projects.°2 If controlling shareholders can resolve these conflicts in their favor, then value would be added to their shares at the expense of the minority's shares, with little risk of being held liable for wrongdoing. 0 3 Controlling shareholders may also receive some private benefits by reallocating firm resources to directly benefit themselves, thereby taking value from minority shareholders. Several studies have found that large blocks persistently trade at premiums-absent any attempt to engage in a takeover-suggesting that markets may price these private benefits. While the potential for the benefits through misallocation of firm resources is undeniable, the probability that these activities are significant enough to account for the magnitude of control premiums in a 101 For an argument that demand curves slope downward, based on observed price increases upon the announcement of the inclusion of a stock in the Standard & Poor's 500 Index, see Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579 (1986). The most probable explanation, according to Shleifer, is that an outward shift in the demand curve occurs because index funds must now purchase the stock, and the increased demand pushes the demand curve outward and places the new equilibrium further out on what is implicitly an upward-sloping demand curve. Id. at 580. While this suggests that increasing demand from groups of investors such as index funds may affect price (without any information signal), it does not challenge the essential flatness of the curves facing individual investors. Indeed, it is impossible to differentiate between moves along one curve or the other (with either or both having a slight slope) and a shift in that curve. significant number of cases is likely negligible because of the stringent legal rules against such activity.' 0 5 On the other hand, the minimization of coordination costs and the ability to decide among distribution and investment opportunities are benefits that can never flow to shareholders generally. Instead, most shareholders must select companies that have credibly signaled policies that correspond to their own preferences. To the extent that other private benefits are similar to agency costs, they too cannot be shared with public investors. Either a controlling shareholder captures them or management itself captures them (although they are called agency costs). In competitive markets these costs are irreducible, because the marginal costs of further monitoring and prevention devices exceed marginal gains.'°I
II. THE FAIRNESS ARGUMENTS
In Part II, we argued that in the absence of an imminent and readily valued control transaction, receipt of the market price by minority shareholders in effect gives them their pro rata share of the value of the firm. In this Part, we relax the assumption that shares are traded in efficient capital markets that formed the basis for the discussion in Part II. Indeed, for present purposes, whether market prices fully reflect all publicly available information and result in prices being set in an unbiased manner is largely irrelevant. All we assume in this Part is that investors know when a controlling shareholder dominates corporate policy, along with whatever probabilities that creates for a freezeout transaction or some disproportionate distribution of the benefits that flow from stock ownership. Lacking other legal guidance, we define "unfairness" here as a failure to receive bargained-for property 105 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 722-23 (holding a parent corporation liable for failure to pay a subsidiary promptly and take all product required under an output contract); see also The Delaware courts have stated that in appraisal proceedings the courts are to assume that the dissenting shareholder would have preferred to remain a shareholder in the original enterprise. This underlies the statement in Tri-Continental that "the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern."' 8 Thus, in M.G. Bancorporation v. Le
Beau,' 0 9 the Delaware Chancery Court rejected an appraisal based on market values, because the witness "had determined only the 'fair market value' of MGB's minority shares, as opposed to valuing MGB in its entirety as a going concern and then determining the fair value of the minority shares as a pro rata percentage of that value."" 0 The Delaware courts have thus moved from a presumption that a public shareholder only owns a minority interest (in sale of control cases) to a claim of entitlement to a pro rata share of firm value. Implicitly, this gives the investor a right to a pro rata share of all the benefits flowing from the corporation to its owners. 5, 1995) ).
II The Delaware Supreme Court has noted:
The underlying assumption in an appraisal valuation is that the dissenting shareholders would be willing to maintain their investment position had the merger not occurred. Accordingly, the Court of Chancery's task in an appraisal proceeding is to value what has been taken from the shareholder, i.e., the proportionate interest in the going concern. To that end, this Court has held that the corporation must be valued as an operating entity. We conclude that the Court of Chancery did not adhere to this principle. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996) (citations omitted).
In addition to being an unrealistic reflection of the value to be received on a sale of control, it does not reflect the reality of day-today operations. A majority shareholder has exclusive control over dividend policy, investment policy, and the timing of the sale or liquidation of the firm. Any or all of these factors may-given different situations about taxes, alternative investment opportunities, and the like-impact different shareholders differently." 2 Despite the criticism of an older line of commentary, 1 3 the control premium does not appear to be explained generally by the ability to loot the firm or engage in any wrongdoing and potential expropriation benefits appear to be too small to influence the valuation of target companies. [Vol. 152: 845 of diversification." 6 No one claims that public shareholders have the ability to create value by reducing these costs. Finally, this position of entitlement to remain a shareholder in a going concern ignores the property rights of minority shareholders. Minority shareholders do not have a right to remain shareholders -however willing they may be-in the face of majority voting rules on such questions as asset sales, liquidations, mergers and reverse stock splits."
7 All of these events may cause the involuntary exit of minority shareholders. In contrast to some other jurisdictions, only mergers create dissenter's rights in Delaware." s In all other cases, absent fraud or equitable grounds forjudicial interference, shareholders must take what the transaction produces for them.
Public Shareholders' Expectations of a Control Premium
The sale of a control block of shares illuminates the law's general policy in control transactions. Is it unfair for a controlling shareholder to secure the entire control premium for itself by selling all its shares? The judicial answer has almost universally been no. REV. 248, 249 (1985) ("It is unlikely that any American court today would reject the general proposition that controlling shareholders may obtain a premium for their shares which they need not share with other shareholders."). There are exceptions, such as seizure of corporate opportunities and sales to looters, which are not relevant a controlling shareholder exists at the time of purchase, investors can determine that the controlling shareholder may be the exclusive recipient of a control premium and that investment and distribution policies likely will be set by the controlling shareholder. Rational investors in efficient markets, aware of this possibility, will take those features into account when setting the market price for the shares.
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Thus, when minority shareholders are cashed out without receiving a control premium, they have received exactly what they bargained for. Further, the amount they receive, if no more than the pre-freeze-out market value, will allow them to purchase a comparable financial asset.
Most shareholders in public corporations, other than founders and their heirs, have purchased their shares in the initial public offering or in public markets after the firm has gone public. Under these circumstances, if some of the arguments set out above are to be believed, founders may be said to have sold their shares at a "minority discount." Any public shareholder contemplating a subsequent sale of these shares will expect that the same discount will apply when she sells. The rule of markets thus facing any public shareholder is "in here. While Delaware has not faced this question directly, there has been no deviation from the majority rule. In Krieger v. Anderson, 182 A.2d 907 (Del. 1962), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal of a complaint by mutual fund shareholders against owners of the former management company for a share of an alleged control premium obtained. Rejecting the argument that several of the stockholders of the management company were directors of the fund and thus owed their gains to the fund, the court criticized the plaintiffs argument, which, taken to its logical conclusion, would mean that management company shareholders "can never sell the shares for what they are really worth." Id. at 910. In the court's estimation, "[t] his conclusion offends one's sense of fairness." Id. In Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 224 (Del. Ch. 1990), plaintiffs argued that controlling shareholders had sold their control to a looter. In dicta, Chancellor Allen stated:
While Delaware law has not addressed this specific question, one is not left without guidance from our decided cases. Several principles deducible from that law are pertinent. First, is the principle that a shareholder has a right to sell his or her stock and in the ordinary case owes no duty in that connection to other shareholders when acting in good faith. n.275 (2001) (explaining that a minority shareholder will sometimes sell its shares at a discount "on the theory that outside investors will pay less for a minority stake in a close corporation because of their inability to control management").
with a discount, out with a discount." Each purchaser of shares, quite naturally, is only willing to pay for what she expects to get. Under these circumstances, if minority shareholders obtain a pro rata share of a control premium, they receive a windfall for which they did not pay, and to which they had no reasonable expectation. That gain, of course, results in a corresponding and equally unjustifiable loss for the controlling shareholder.
B. The Pro Rata and Expectancy Arguments
There are basic assumptions of equality of treatment in most areas of corporate law. Since Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,l2 the Delaware courts have held that majority shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to the S 122 minority when they exercise control over the corporation.
Victor Brudney and Marvin Chirelstein famously argued for a sharing of the gains in a parent-subsidiary merger, by analogizing the parent to a trustee who is required to allocate benefits fairly between multiple trusts.1 23 The rule they suggested was a pro rata sharing of the gains obtained in a merger 4 -a rule that has not, to our knowledge, been expressly adopted by any court.
Later Delaware cases have suggested that parent corporations owe a duty of "entire fairness" to the public shareholders of the subsidiary and that this consists of both fair dealing and fair price, but have thus far failed to distinguish fair price .
• 126 in these circumstances from the appraisal valuation. Id. at 321.
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The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, however, approved lowering the weight accorded market value in a "Delaware Block" method appraisal, citing Brudney & Chirelstein's concerns that "an acquiring parent corporation which occupies the position of a majority shareholder" may have nonpublic information about future values not reflected in current market prices. Additionally, since all public shareholders share in such a premium, there is little reason to argue for an additional premium above this price. Accurately measuring the gains to the managers, however, is impossible. Indeed, in many cases bidders have overestimated value, and paid public shareholders too much.13 This illustrates the extreme difficulties in measuring fairness in going private transactions.
C. The Evidence from Contracts
In the case of mergers, particularly cash-out mergers following takeover bids, there is ample evidence of what shareholders regard as a fair price ex ante, as opposed to the ex post positions taken in the practical effect of the remedy we do grant him will be co-extensive with the liberalized valuation and appraisal methods we herein approve for cases coming after this decision."). 412 (1996) (noting that some see MBOs "as the product of a desire by one group to exploit a business opportunity that requires the elimination of the minori "').
Id. at 408-12 (suggesting that value may differ from market price based on nonpublic information which, if publicly available, would cause the market price to more clearly reflect the manager's private knowledge).
Seejeffry appraisal proceedings. This evidence shows a strong reliance on markets and shareholder processes: any price agreed to by a specified majority of the shareholders in an uncoerced setting is deemed to be a fair price at which the remaining shareholders can be cashed out.
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To this end, hundreds and probably thousands of firms have adopted "shark repellent" amendments to their charters.1 3 The most common form of shark repellent provides that in the event of a takeout merger with an "interested stockholder," a specified percentage of all shares must approve the merger. This percentage is usually between twothirds and ninety-five percent. Sometimes, however, this supermajority rule is relaxed in response to one of two possible events: (1) pre-takeover approval of the merger by the incumbent directors, who presumably have fiduciary obligations to ensure that all shareholders are treated fairly, or (2) the payment of a "fair price" to the remaining public shareholders, typically defined as the highest price paid for shares of the target by the successful bidder within the past two 135 years.
These charter amendments have required shareholder approval, suggesting that shareholders believe this provides adequate protection of their interest in the company.
If shareholders vote in favor of such amendments and agree to accept prices consented to by a majority of their fellow shareholders, why is a price determined in this manner not fair to them in the context of an appraisal proceeding? To avoid this inconsistency, any takeout merger following the acquisition of control at the same price as the control transaction should be presumed fair, absent a showing 132 The widespread employment of "shark repellent" charter amendments that assure minority public shareholders that they will receive at least as much as the tendering majority of shareholders received is evidence of a willingness to accept the same price the majority found attractive. The absence of a successful takeover bid during a freeze-out of minority shareholders by a long-term majority shareholder raises a different issue. In this situation, there is no evidence of any probability of a takeover bid that would create a control premium. Indeed, the majority shareholder would not require ownership of all stock in order to obtain a control premium; it could simply sell its existing shares. What remains, then, is a suspicion that a majority shareholder may find a freeze-out is to its benefit because it creates, in a sense, invisible wealth transfers from the minority. This is a slim reed on which to build a conclusion that "intrinsic" values will always be in excess of market prices.
IV. THE FORGOTTEN STATUTE: INTERPRETATIVE CONFLICTS
We now move to a discussion of why the Delaware Supreme Court's stance conflicts with the appraisal statute and other aspects of Delaware law. Regardless of whether one accepts the previous arguments made in this Article, these conflicts must be addressed and are not easily resolved absent a rejection of the general use of control premiums in appraisal proceedings.
A. Excluding the Gains from the Transaction: Warnings About Speculation
Delaware's appraisal statute, section 262(h), commands the court to determine the fair value of "shares ... exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation .... This rule implicitly recognizes that by exiting the firm, the shareholder is not bearing the risks of the merged firm and should not share in the anticipated rewards from its success. Regardless of whether one agrees with this aspect of the Weinberger decision, it is clear that the courts may not make speculative determinations of value. Also, Delaware courts generally have been careful to distinguish between values created by the announced merger and the value of the pre-merger firm. This is true even where a new controlling shareholder has begun to implement value-creating strategies in anticipation of total ownership after the 141 merger.
Application of a control premium in freeze-outs involves speculation about aspects of value that might be created by a hypothetical merger. In such cases, the parties and benefits of the hypothetical merger are not known and, therefore, cannot be directly analyzed. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to square the use of control premiums with the cautionary language of the appraisal statute and its interpretation by Weinberger and other decisions. The message of both of these authorities militates against such a device. Indeed, the best evidence that no control premiums are currently unrecognized in the stock's price is the fact that no transfer of control is taking place in the class of freeze-out mergers that we address here.
B. The Stock Market Exception
Awarding a control premium in an appraisal proceeding unjustifiably treats cash and stock mergers differently in terms of value received. Like many other states, Delaware provides an exception from appraisal rights where the consideration given to the minority shareholders is stock in another publicly held corporation. If, as the Delaware courts now believe, the market price of all companies reflects a minority discount, then the minority shareholders who sold into the market would receive less than the full value of their shares.
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Manning argued that appraisal was unnecessary to protect minority shareholders in mergers. In his view, the expense and delay of the remedy were so great that the net proceeds to shareholders were unlikely to exceed what could be obtained by selling into the market.
T and written demand, dissenting shareholders shall be paid the value of their stock at the date of merger.
It is hardly surprising that in its initial decisions in this area, the Delaware Supreme Court did not consider the issues of control premiums or minority discounts. In 1950, the year in which Ti-Continental Corp. v. Battye' 49 was decided, the control premium phenomenon, in the context of sales of control, was barely on the horizon (although it would generate much discussion in the following two decades). 5 In Tri-Continental, the court's statement that shareholders should be paid the value of their stock simply meant that they were not entitled to a valuation based upon their pro rata share of the value of the underlying firm assets as if liquidation occurred. Those shareholders that did not dissent and that received shares in another publicly traded entity would thus be treated quite differently. It is puzzling that no Delaware court has ever noted this remarkably disparate treatment.
C. Section 155 and "Fair Value"
We note one additional conflict in Delaware corporate law relevant to this discussion. Section 155 of the Delaware Corporations Code governs the issuance and disposition of fractional shares and provides that "[a] corporation may, but shall not be required to, issue fractions of a share. If it does not issue fractions of a share, it shall... pay in cash the fair value of fractions of a share as of the time when those entitled to receive such fractions are determined ....
In a recent reverse stock split to eliminate small holdings, Avaya, Inc. proposed to pay holders of fractional shares the average market price of their shares over the ten-day period preceding the transaction.1 54 In approving the proposal as fair, ChiefJustice Veasey stated:
The corporation owes its cashed-out stockholders payment representing the "fair value" of their fractional interests. The cashed-out stockholders will receive fair value if Avaya compensates them with payment based on the price of Avaya stock averaged over a ten-day period preceding the Proposed Transaction. While market price is not employed in all valuation contexts, our jurisprudence recognizes that in many circumstances a property interest is best valued by the amount a buyer will pay for it. The Vice Chancellor correctly concluded that a well-informed, liquid trading market will provide a measure of fair value superior to any estimate the court could impose.155
The Avaya opinion distinguished its use of market value as the exclusive basis for determining fair value in a fractional shares case under section 155 from the same exercise in appraisal cases, on the basis that the appraisal statute instructs that "[i]n determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.", 56 We simply observe that in an efficient market, absent information about some market failure, market price is the only relevant factor. The result is that under section 155, "fair value" means "market value" and under section 262, "fair value" cannot mean "market value." This result is true even if that market value is based on a "well-informed, liquid trading market [that] will provide a measure of fair value superior ,,158
to any estimate the court could impose. Probably the most interesting issue that the Avaya decision raises is the distinction in procedure that the court has created between a reverse stock split to eliminate small holdings and the use of a freezeout merger to accomplish the same end. Such a distinction is not supported by the statutory language and may have unintended effects. Future majority shareholders may be well advised to choose the reverse stock split as the most efficient method of eliminating minority shareholders. If they so choose, then the control premium problem of appraisal will become moot, since all freeze-outs will be structured as reverse stock splits. A more consistent jurisprudence would abandon formalistic distinctions and make both freeze-out methods available by relying on market values, unless plaintiffs could establish to the courts' satisfaction that market values were unreliable in a particular instance, and demonstrate the direction and magnitude of the error.
CONCLUSION
Modern financial theory has provided many insights into value, including ECMH and portfolio theory. These models do not support the current use of control premiums in appraisal proceedings. Since the Delaware courts are entrusted to determine the "fair value" of a dissenter's shares, the Delaware courts should bring clear consideration of current financial knowledge to the appraisal process. Even if this knowledge is set aside, confused, or simply rejected, so that one 156 DEL. CODE AINN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2001), cited in Avaya, 812 A.2d at 889 n.28. 157 We assume that Delaware's "independent legal significance" doctrine will continue to be applicable.
158 812 A.2d at 890.
assumes that minority discounts are generally reflected in market prices, a shareholder is fairly compensated when paid such a discounted value because the shareholder can easily replace such a discounted stock with another equally discounted stock. Furthermore, when the current use of control premiums is highlighted against the backdrop of the structure and language of the Delaware appraisal statute and other aspects of Delaware corporate law, a tension is created that is not easily rectified absent rejection of control premiums. We suggest that the Delaware Supreme Court rethink its position on control premiums so that dissenting shareholders are fairly compensated without unnecessarily transferring value from the majority or creating statutory conflicts.
